Hellenistic Age - Philosophical Schools - Epicurus

Epicurus is an ancient Greek philosopher who was born in Samos or Athens in 341. After studying at first in Miletina, and later in Lambsaka / Asia Minor, he settled in Athens in 306 in a large garden that would give his school its name. There, he will inspire and guide the friendly philosophical community till his death: the Garden of Epicurus. Convinced philosopher materialist Epicurus continues and updates the atomic theory of Democritus, upon which he founded a wisdom of pleasure. His moral commitments prevent him from taking all the consequences of his intuitive scientific insights. His doctrine, marked by the constant ointment of passions, is on a completely different plane than the one who attributes to its offspring. Epicurus has written many pieces of work, but most of them have not come to us. Only three letters survived (to Herodotus, Pitokles and Menokayi), which set out the main components of his doctrine. We have reached dozens of his maxims and endorsements. They are complemented and enriched by the philosophical poem "On the Nature of Things" by Lucretius, his zealous Latin follower. They still allow us to create a more accurate idea of his system. Traditionally, the Epicureans have distinguished three parts in the Master's doctrine: the canonical, which contains the rules and criteria of knowledge; physics or science for nature and finally the ethics that brings us into the art of living in happiness.

In the canonical part, Epicurus sets three criteria for achieving the truth: the sensations, the anticipsies (ie, the general ideas as they come from experience / and the affections / the pleasure and the pain). But these three criteria are easily reduced to the first, and this gives reason to speak of epicureal sensualism. The senses are the source, the foundation and the guarantee of any real knowledge, and the very reason, Lecrecius later, is "his overall result." For Epicurus, the canonics only has a helper function. In fact, physics or knowledge of nature (physis) is the true foundation of doctrine. This physics is inspired by the theory of materiality and the continuity of the world; there is only the matter and the empty space that are determined by their mutual exclusion: where there is matter, there is no empty space; where there is empty space, there is no matter. These two substances are sufficient to explain everything, including man, thought, and gods. In fact nothing is born of nothing: at the beginning of every thing must be found eternal beings that are not born and from which everything is born. These are the atoms and the emptiness. Epicurus develops the atomicity of Democritus: atoms are absolutely complete, indivisible, immutable, innumerable and non-varied bodies (though they remain below the threshold of sensory perception), which are in eternal movement in the empty space. Unlike Demokritus, who assumes that the movement of atoms is a primacy that is neither possible nor necessary to explain, Epicer argues that if this movement is not a beginning, it is not without reason. Three reasons are enough to explain it, since all three are absolutely necessary. The first two are conceived in analogy with the experience: atoms are propelled from the top downward by their weight (which is the intrinsically irrevocable property of the atoms) in all directions from the collisions. But these two reasons - gravity and collision - seem incompatible with each other. Indeed, in the hollow void, all atoms must fall vertically down to infinity without ever colliding. Then there should be neither collisions nor rebounds, and the universe would only represent a perpetual and unplanned rain of atoms. There would be no complex bodies or worlds, and we would not have been in it to explain what, in fact, would not need to exist. Is it impossible to assume that the heavier atoms could catch up with the lighter ones? This would mean that it is not known, explains Lucretius, that in the empty space all bodies move "at the same speed, despite their uneven weight." As their fall is done on an absolutely straight vertical line, they can never meet and collide.

So there is probably a third reason for movement to make the first two compatible and to explain the appearance of complex bodies. This third reason, traditionally attributed to Epicurus, is the deviation or bending of the atoms / of the Greek parenkleisis, at the Latin clinamen: when they fall in a straight line through the void, they deviate slightly from the vertical enough to be able to say, that their movement turns out to be altered; this change of trajectory takes place at an indefinite point and place. This third cause of movement, both internal (gravity) and interrupted (collisions), is the basis of the encounter of atoms and also of the emergence of complex bodies: without this deviation, explains Lucretius, "no collision could be born, no collision would have taken place, and nature would never have spawned." But le clinamen is also the foundation of freedom: without this attractive spontaneity, which is not defined neither in space nor in time, the endless chain of causes would be ineffectual, and living creatures would be captives of inexorable necessity. Thus, through le lekamenen, a causal disruption is inserted that frees the present from the past and maintains the openness to the future. So there is neither fate nor provocation: things are created either by necessity, by chance or by ourselves, and in this respect we are free. They have long criticized Epicurus for this uncertainty of atoms, which today contributes to the continuous radiance and the surprising modernity of his doctrine. Naturally, Epicurus's physics can not be called a science in its present sense. But its infinite Universe, made up of atoms and empty space and pierced by movements that are partly due to chance, is surprisingly close to ours. This embodiment of modernity is also reinforced by Epicurus's Theory of Multiple Worlds. Since the atoms are countless in the infinite space, Epicurus explains, and since chance, in the endless time, produces necessarily everything possible, it is absurd to think that our world is the only one absurd to imagine that our world is in the center of the universe, or that its gods pay some extra attention. The worlds-as it is now supposed to be spoken in plural - are enormous organized assemblies of atoms subordinate to birth and death (the universe is eternal, but none of the worlds composing it is eternal). Atoms are infinite numbers in the infinite universe.

We must not fear the gods at all, not because they do not exist / "the knowledge we have about them is obvious," said Epicurus, but because they are not dealing with us: their happiness to their immortal. We should not be afraid of death at all, not because one does not die, but because one really dies. Death is pure nehity; it is nothing for us: it is not here when we are here, and when it is here, we are no longer here. As for pain, it always has limits: when it is very acute, it is short; when durable, is tolerable. The mind, cleansed from the unwarranted fears of superstition (the gods and Tartara), can then enjoy the pleasure of happiness: this peaceful enjoyment is happiness itself. But what is the pleasure? Here, they have to be different, Epicurus explains, different types of pleasure. Indeed, every pleasure in itself is good, just as any pain is evil. But no pleasure should be chosen, nor should any pain be avoided. One has to give up that pleasure, which would bring him more trouble and take some pain as a prerequisite for greater happiness. There follows a two-thirty classification of desires. Pleasures are natural and unnatural. The latter (the wishes for wealth, power and glory, etc.) are by nature unlimited, vain, because there is no object that can satisfy them. The sage can only give up on them. The first, the natural and the necessary desires are always good: because they are directed to the objects necessary for life itself (like food), or for comfort (clothing), or for happiness (like friendship or philosophy). They are easy to satisfy and bring peace to the body and soul. The second, the natural and the necessary desires, are good in themselves, but sometimes, if one becomes a slave, they can bring more trouble into pleasure than pleasures. Such are the sexual and aesthetic desires. The sage here will prove that he can distinguish himself and enjoy as much as possible the pleasures presented to him. He must not forget that no pleasure is absolutely necessary for his happiness: he has pleasures given in surplus, pleasant when presented, but which should not be missed when we are not presented.

Hence the well-known epicurus ethic paradox: based on pleasure (hedonism), it leads to almost-asceticism. It is so that if the pleasure is the highest good, it is such if it can be achieved completely and mildly: a little bread, a little water, a little philosophy is enough. Pleasure does not consist of delight but consists of the following: the body must not suffer, but the soul must not be embroiled in confusion. This state is called a literal (lack of interference), which represents peace for the soul and whose real name is the mood. After Epicurus' most famous students - Metrodor, Hermarch and Polistrat - follow many followers of the Garden of Epicurus. The Epicurean doctrine, resurrected by Lucretius, conquers Rome, where a common epicureanism, which continues to spread among the plebs to the 2nd century AD, was conquered by scholasticism that sharpened during the Renaissance and the 17th century, supporters of the new science return to epicurus atomism and sensualism. So philosophers like Gassendi, and later Didero and Nietzsche can be regarded as Epicureans. The quest for individual happiness, this principle, which calls for reflection to avoid everything that ultimately brings more trouble than happiness, was often condemned by Cicero as an invitation to fall into sensual pleasures. The strict, even ascetic, feature of life outside the world disappears, along with other philosopher's recommendations, whose name becomes synonymous with lust, and his disciples were often referred to as "pigs" later. From this ridiculous absurd comes the notion of "epicureanism," which is based on one of the most surprising misunderstandings that struck the history of philosophical thought.

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