Each Is To Count For One; No One For More Than One

The central thesis of classical utilitarianism is this: The moral rightness of an action is determined by the balance of its good versus bad consequences with respect to the members of a given group to which the agent belongs. This calculation is predicated on the assumption that every member of the group is equal to every other member.

If perfect strangers were regarded with the same care as parents or children or wives or husbands or other close relations, then it is possible that the greater happiness of the greater number could be served. Many reasons can be adduced for this line of thought -- but none of them are morally permissible. After all, it is not only understandable but morally right that a parent should give far greater weight to the interests of his or her child than the interests of a perfect stranger. We cannot with moral propriety ask that a person value the welfare or happiness of all fellow humans equally. Ethically valid relationships imply differential treatment. Even-handedness has a place with respect to public office (legislature, judge, etc), but it is not compatible with the valid moral impulses that root in interpersonal bonds. It is my view, then, that the classical utilitarian line of thought shatters on the realization of what Adam Smith called the "vicarious affects."